Realizing EHR potential, or avoiding patient endangerment?

I noted an interesting comment posted in the comment thread of Bob Wachter's post "Putting the “A” Back in SOAP Notes: Time to Tackle An Epic Problem."

The comment by Dr. Christine Sinsky reads (there seems to be no way to link directly to it):

Great post Bob.  Ambulatory records are equally in need of brevity and clarity. These notes are often 6 pages of mostly nonsensical boiler plate, formatted on a billing template, leaving the reader asking your question: “but what is going on with the patient?”

After 10 years with our clinic’s EHR (McKesson HAC) and 9 years with our hospital EHR (Cerner), the most important issues I’ve encountered have been

The time costs of data acquisition: Remember the graphic on a clipboard at the foot of the bed? It was a concise and convenient source of information that has not been reproduced in our EHR. It is now a laborious process to unearth this same information. I/Os and daily weights have become lost data points.

The time costs of data input: One night on call I did a time trial on six of my admissions: it took an average of 73 seconds to record the admitting orders on paper vs 17 minutes to enter the same orders electronically. And in the electronic world I find myself at higher risk of forgetting the orders I meant to write, as the rigid sequence mandated by the EHR is not always the logical clinical sequence in my mind, and it requires parking orders in my mind until I finish marching through laborious tick boxes.

Diminished situational awareness. Nurses, doctors and others have a more myopic view of the patient, as it is harder to see trends and to see the big picture. Nurses may only know the meds and the orders that pertain to their shift for example.

Barriers to synthesis: I find it harder to synthesize the diverse sources of data for a patient when each data bit is tucked away in hard to reach electronic silos, often down long navigational pathways. Sometimes one has to scroll both vertically and horizontally (without freeze frames, so the column and row headings disappear while you scroll) creating a cognitive nightmare.

EHRs will continue to be an important tool going forward; improved usability and a better alignment with clinical workflows are needed if we are to fully realize their potential.

I thought the bullet list not at all surprising, and added the following comment in reply to amplify an implied but unstated point:

Re: “EHRs will continue to be an important tool going forward; improved usability and a better alignment with clinical workflows are needed if we are to fully realize their potential.”

You just described what could indisputably be called serious impediments to care. 73 seconds to 17 minutes? Loss of easily accessed data on I/O and daily weights? Diminished situational awareness?

Perhaps it’s time clinicians stopped sugar coating their statements with PC [politically correct - ed.] niceties such as "... if we are to fully realize their potential”, and were more forceful with a more apt “improved usability and a better alignment with clinical workflows are needed if we are to avoid patient endangerment.”

Disruptive effects like these, in my view, lend more import towards speaking of the latter than of the former.

-- SS

Who Really Makes Brand-Name Pharmaceuticals?

A striking illustration of the hazards to patients' and the public's health from health care organizational leaders using fashionable management techniques to maximize short-term revenue appeared in Reuters. 

Background: The Contaminated Heparin from China

The particular issue got public notice after US patients started to get sick and die after being infused with heparin, the common anti-coagulant drug. As we have discussed repeatedly starting in 2008 (look here, and see the summary at the end of the post), Baxter International was selling contaminated heparin under its label which was made in unregulated workshops in China, and then transmitted through a complex chain of Chinese and US companies.  What helped to further obscure the problem was what Baxter was buying was called the active pharmaceutical ingredient (API), which actualy means it was buying the active drug from poorly documented foreign sources.  In other words, it had entirely outsourced the manufacturing of a drug it sold as if it had been made by Baxter in the US.

Continued Outsourcing to Questionable Drug Manufacturers

Reuters reported on a new investigation of outsourcing of drug manufacturing to China.  The main point was:
Four years ago, Beijing promised to clean up its act following the deaths of at least 149 Americans who received contaminated Chinese supplies of the blood-thinner heparin. But an examination by Reuters has found that unregulated Chinese chemical companies making active pharmaceutical ingredients (API) are still selling their products on the open market with few or no checks.

Interviews with more than a dozen API producers and brokers indicate drug ingredients are entering the global supply chain after being made with no oversight from China's State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA), and with no Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) certification, an internationally recognized standard of quality assurance.

'There is falsification of APIs going on, we know it,' said Lembit Rago, coordinator for Quality Assurance and Safety in Medicines with the World Health Organisation (WHO).

In fact, the article made the point that the majority of drugs sold worldwide are the product of outsourced, often unregulated, and potentially contaminated and adulterated manufacturing:
'Illegal ingredients in bulk are a big problem, but nobody talks about it,' said Guy Villax, chief executive of Hovione, an API supplier based in Portugal with factories there and in China, the United States and Ireland.

About 70 to 80 percent of all active drug ingredients - the biologically active component in medicines - originate in China and India, estimate industry experts, with China accounting for the lion's share. Its export market in these products is worth $22 billion in annual sales, according to the China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Medicines and Health Products.

'If China for some reason decided to stop exporting APIs, within three months all our pharmacies would be empty,' said Villax.
How Dodgy Manufacturers Continue to Operate

Apparently, a particular problem in China is that APIs, that is, the particular drugs in question, can be made by chemical as opposed to officially designated "pharmaceutical" companies, and these chemical companies are not regulated,
A key regulatory weakness in China is the distinction between pharmaceutical and chemical companies. While the former are regulated by the SFDA, the latter, making everything from sweeteners to solvents, are not. Yet many chemical companies also churn out drug ingredients, exploiting a loophole by describing the products as chemicals, which they are, rather than the more specific designation of APIs.

For example, the article recounted how an unregulated chemical company was apparently a source for a well-known branded pharmaceutical sold by two big pharmaceutical companies headquartered in developed countries,
[A]company, Jinan Hongfangde Pharmatech (JHP), of Jinan city in Shandong province, had a product list showing at least five patented products for sale. They included tiotropium bromide, a blockbuster lung drug co-promoted by Boehringer-Ingelheim and Pfizer Inc and sold under the name Spiriva,...

Both Boehringer-Ingelheim and Pfizer spokespeople claimed that they only bought drugs from known sources, but then it would be pointless for Jinan Hongfangde Pharmatech to manufacture tiotropium bromide.

The Use of Brokers

More questions were raised by the pharmaceutical company's apparently common practice of buying drugs through brokers,
The rise of the Internet has facilitated exports of drug ingredients. An online search brings up websites offering hundreds of Chinese API sellers. Those not GMP-certified or SFDA-registered are not necessarily substandard, but buyers lack independent quality assurance.

The pervasive presence of brokers in the supply line is another risk. Pharmaceutical companies looking to source APIs in China typically hire middlemen to help them navigate the language, red tape and protocol. That system helps Chinese companies making substandard APIs avoid detection.

The reason corporate executives choose to buy drugs in China rather than having their companies manufacture them themselves seems to be to reduce costs. A post on the In-Pharma blog quoted Lembit Rago, the same WHO official quoted by Reuters, thus,
There are Chinese manufacturers supplying APIs of high quality to multinational companies, but there are also companies producing APIs of poor or not defined quality.
So,
As long as there are customers for substandard APIs they will be produced and sold.

The cheapest Chinese drugs, of course, come from the most questionable manufacturers, and that may not be apparent to companies who use brokers to facilitate purchases.
'Any number of foreign pharmaceutical companies go no further than looking for API suppliers at CPhI (an international pharmaceutical fair) based only on price,' [manaing director of Samsara Biopharma Consulting Robert] Walsh said.

Reuters spoke to brokers who said an API made by an unregulated chemical company would cost less than one from a company that had a GMP certificate.

'Different (API) grades have different prices. Sometimes we accept an order sheet and we happen to find a factory that can do it cheaper than our factory, we will outsource to them and make a bigger margin,' said one broker based in China who sources for a South African outsourcing firm.

In China there are few legal repercussions for broker firms who relabel or misrepresent products, and tracing counterfeit and substandard APIs is extremely difficult.

'There are a lot of brokers who are relabeling (APIs) which means you can't trace where the API comes from and that adds to the risk,' said the WHO's quality assurance expert Rago.

Andre, the Belgian drug detective, estimates he has uncovered fraud or misrepresentations in as many as 25 percent of cases where he has been hired to audit factories all over China. 'If you can substitute an API that is expensive to make and manufactured at a high level with something that costs much less, then that can happen,' Andre said. 'It's impossible to give an exact number, but it's not rare. It's a minority, but not tiny minority.'
Use of Substandard Raw Materials

Meanwhile, a post on PharmaLot suggested that the supposedly regulated Chinese "pharmaceutical" companies may implement questionable manufacturing practices,
A subsidiary of the Joincare Pharmaceutical Group reportedly used reprocessed cooking oil – otherwise known as ‘gutter’ oil – to make a widely used antibiotic in China. If the term gutter oil is unfamiliar, this refers to reprocessed oil made from kitchen waste dredged from gutters behind restaurants. The State Food and Drug Administration is now investigating the charge after media reports over the past several days, China Daily reports.

Why might gutter oil be purchased to produce antibiotics? The oil is cheaper than the more expensive soybean oil used to make 7-aminocephalosporinic acid, or 7-ACA, a chemical for produce cephalosporins. Joincare produces 25 percent of the total amount of the chemical, although up to a dozen other drugmakers may have purchased gutter oil from various suppliers, according to various Chinese media reports. For its part, Joincare reportedly denied using gutter oil.

The companies reportedly bought the recycled cooking oil from a company called Huikang Grease Co., which is facing prosecution over its alleged processing and selling of thousands of tons of gutter oil in 2010 and 2011. The Shanghai Daily reported that Huikang received around $22.5 million for roughly 14,700 tons of gutter oil sold to Jiaozuo Joincare Biological Product, a unit of Joincare.

Summary

There is increasing evidence that a substantial proportion, probably the majority of drugs sold by big pharmaceutical companies based in developed countries were actually made by often poorly regulated firms based elsewhere, often China or India. To put it more directly, most so called pharmaceutical companies in the US and other developed countries have outsourced the actual manufacturing of drugs. Thus, most companies that appear to be pharmaceutical manufacturing companies are really just pharmaceutical marketing and development companies. (And not so much the latter, look here:  Light DW, Lexchin JR. Pharmaceutical R&D; what do we get for all that money? Brit Med J 2012; 345: 22-25.  Link here.) Pharmaceutical companies appear to be abandoning their core essence, but are content to market drugs  under their logos without telling the patients who take them the real source of these products.  This would appear to be a big scandal, but one that stays curiously anechoic.

I have yet to see any discussion with pharmaceutical executives about why their companies hardly make drugs anymore. In the absence of such discussion, I can only speculate that most likely, this is first a product of financialization. Drug company executives, like most organizational leaders, have fallen under the spell that says their only goal should be to increase short-term revenues. It may be cheaper to buy drugs from perhaps dodgy outsourced suppliers rather than manufacturing them them themselves. Continuing stories like those above, and that of the contaminated Chinese heparin suggest that these outsourced drugs are cheap for a reason. It appears that to save money short-term, pharmaceutical executives may be abandoning their most central mission, to provide pure, unadulterated drugs.

The continuing story of outsourced pharmaceutical manufacturing provides yet more evidence that current management dogma may be literally toxic. Once again, I suggest that true health care reform requires leadership of health care organization who put patients' and the public's health ahead of short-term revenue (and the personal enrichment that may result).

It is likely that a number of policy changes will be needed to reduce the threats posed by contaminated or adulterated outsourced pharmaceuticals.  There is one simple step that ought to be taken quickly to at least make the problem more transparent.  In the US, most manufactured products have a label disclosing the country of origin.  In parallel with that, all pharmaceutical containers, and all pharmaceutical labels and marketing materials ought to disclose the country in which the active pharmaceutical ingredient was manufactured, and the name and location of the company responsible for that manufacture. 


Appendix - Heparin Case Summary

- We have posted several times, recently here about the tragic case of suddenly allergenic heparin. Although heparin, an intravenous biologic anti-coagulant, has been in use for over 70 years, serious allergic reactions to it had heretofore been rare. Starting late in 2007, hundreds of such reactions, and 21 deaths were reported in the US after intravenous heparin infusions.All the heparin related to these events in the US was made by Baxter International.

- We then learned that although the heparin carried the Baxter label, it was not really made by Baxter. The company had outsourced production of the active ingredient to a long, and ultimately mysterious supply chain. Baxter got the active ingredient from a US company, Scientific Protein Laboratories LLC, which in turn obtained it from a factory in China operated by Changzhou SPL, which in turn was owned by Scientific Protein Laboratories and by Changzhou Techpool Pharmaceutical Co. Changzhou SPL, in turn, got it from several consolidators or wholesalers, who in turn got it from numerous small, unidentified "workshops," which seemed to produce the product in often primitive and unsanitary conditions. None of the stops in the Chinese supply chain had apparently been inspected by the US Food and Drug Administration nor its Chinese counterpart. (See posts here and here.)

- We found out that the Baxter International labelled heparin was contaminated with over-sulfated chondroitin sulfate, a substance not found in nature, but which mimics heparin according to the simple laboratory tests used in the Chinese facilities to check incoming heparin. (See post here.) Further testing revealed that the contamination seemed to have taken place in China prior to the provision of the heparin to Changzhou SPL. (See post here.) It is not clear whether Baxter International or Scientific Protein Laboratories had inspected most of the steps in the supply chain, or even knew what went on there.

- The Baxter and Scientific Protein Laboratories CEOs did not seem aware of where they got the heparin on which the Baxter International label was eventually affixed. But one report in the New York Times alleged that Scientific Protein Laboratories would not pay enough for heparin to satisfy any sources other than the small "workshops."

- Leaders of all organizations involved, Baxter International, Scientific Protein Laboratories, Changzhou SPL, the Chinese government, and the US Food and Drug Administration, and the US Congress assigned blame to each other, but none took individual or organizational responsibility. (See post here.)  Note that SPL was recently bought out and taken private, making its current leadership even less transparent (see post here).  A 2010 inspection of an SPL facility by the FDA revealed ongoing manufacturing problems (see post here).

- Researchers (who turned out to have financial ties to a company which is developing an anti-coagulant drug that could compete with the heparin made by Baxter International) investigated the biological mechanisms by which the contamination of the heparin lead to adverse effects, but no one investigated further how the contamination occurred, or who was responsible. (See post here.)

- Hundreds of lawsuits against Baxter have now been filed, so far without resolution. (See post here.)  Efforts to make documents to be used in these cases public so far have not succeeded (see post here).

- A government report which attracted little attention warned of the dangers of pharmaceutical ingredients made in China and subject to virtually no oversight. (See post here.)

-  Despite requests from the US, the Chinese government did not investigate the production of the heparin that lead to the deaths (see post here.)

-  In February, 2011, a congressional investigation of the case was announced, but results are so far unavailable (see post here.)

-  In June, 2011, a jury returned the first verdict in a civil case about the contaminated heparin, awarding money from Baxter International and Scientific Protein Laboratories to the estate of a man who apparently died due to tainted heparin (see post here).

Addiction: A Real Disease with Effective Treatments


By Amanda von Horn, Medical Student





For September's National Recovery Month, let's discuss recovery from alcohol / drug addiction. Odds are that you or someone you know has struggled with addiction, whether it be alcohol, street drugs, or prescription medications. Unfortunately, many believe that those who struggle with addiction are simply weak, lacking morals, or don’t have the desire or will-power to stop using. The fact is that addiction is a chronic brain disease with real physical and psychological symptoms. People may voluntarily use drugs or alcohol initially, but the drugs themselves can change the brain and make it extremely difficult to stop using, even if they have a strong desire to quit. 








This post answers some commonly asked questions about the disease of addiction. Hopefully you will share the information so others understand that with treatment and support, people do recover.





What actually is addiction?


Addiction is a long-term, often relapsing brain disease that results in repetitive and compulsive substance use despite harmful effects or consequences. 


 


Why is it so hard to stop using drugs/alcohol?


With long-term drug/alcohol use, there are significant changes in the “reward” pathways of the brain. These changes can result in needing more and more drugs just to feel normal. Stopping the drug often causes withdrawal, with symptoms such as intense nausea/vomiting, fevers and chills, horrible depression and/or anxiety, and in some cases even life-threatening seizures. 





Why does addiction affect some people more than others?


Addiction can be caused by many factors, and it is hard to predict individuals who are more vulnerable to the disease. A person’s biology and genetics can play a big role; for example, if a parent abuses drugs/alcohol, the child has a higher chance of having the same problem than does a child of parents who don’t use. 





I am struggling with addiction. What kind of treatment is available?


No one treatment is appropriate for everyone. Effective treatment often involves a combination of medication, counseling, behavioral therapy, and 12-step programs such as Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous. In many cases, a person may need hospitalization to treat the physical symptoms of withdrawal in the early stages of recovery. 



The recovery plan must address not only the patient’s addiction but all aspects of his or her life in order for treatment to be effective long-term. Since relapse is often a part of the recovery process, it is important to identify “triggers” (people, places, or things that set off an alcohol or drug craving for someone in recovery) and how to cope with these triggers without the use of alcohol or drugs. 





If you or someone you know is struggling with addiction, please consult a physician for evaluation. Recovery is possible, and there is no better time to ask for help than now.





For more information on addiction, visit http://psychiatry.org/addiction




"MetroHealth, Explorys use huge patient database to revolutionize medical research"

As I have written in the past, beware claims of "revolutions" where healthcare or medical research are involved.  As in a slide in my recent presentation to the Health Informatics Society of Australia on healthcare IT trust, I asked:




In that same talk, I pointed out the "revolutions" usually have downsides, and IT always produces winners and losers (per the empirical research of Social Informatics). 

I also asked "have we suffered a complete breakdown in the scientific method with regard to EHR and clinical IT?" in a 2009 post on uncontrolled EHR data and comparative effectiveness studies at this link.  

In the Aug. 29, 2012 article "MetroHealth, Explorys use huge patient database to revolutionize medical research"  in The Plain Dealer (Ohio), the following claims are proffered.  I am assuming regarding this article, as in newspaper articles I make contributions to, that the researchers were involved in its provenance and content:

Large databases of electronic medical records hold great promise for medical research. In theory they can provide doctors access to huge amounts of anonymous patient data, allowing large-scale population studies without the cost and hassle of patient recruitment, review boards and staff training.

Now, a team of data experts at MetroHealth Medical Center and the Cleveland Clinic Innovations spinoff company Explorys has shown just how powerful such medical records can be: In three months, they've replicated a major medical study that took a Norwegian team 14 years to research and report. And they've done it at a fraction of the cost, with a sample about 40 times as large.

The local effort, led by MetroHealth Chief Medical Informatics Officer Dr. David Kaelber, was possible because of Explorys' database of 14 million electronic medical records gathered from 12 major health systems.

14 million records gathered from 12 major health systems, which may in fact be using disparate EHR systems or versions, is almost indisputably not controlled data.

A comparison to a more rigorous study was conceptualized and performed:

Most of all though, he [Kaelber] needed to prove that it worked -- that he could get exactly the same results as traditional research studies that required more time and resources.

Enter the Norwegian study. In 1994, a group of researchers started registering 26,714 people in the northern region's largest city, Tromso. It was part of a much longer study on the population's heart disease risk. They recorded height, weight and other measures of obesity, then followed participants for 13 years, recording any blood clots they had.

Their conclusion: the combination of obesity and a tall stature significantly increases risk of blood clots, especially in men.

The same hypothesis was tested with the uncontrolled EHR data, with claims that (obviously) the time and expense were lower, at least in the instant sense (costs of EHR implementation and maintenance in 12 major health systems could be in the billions of dollars at a time when a health system can easily spend $100 million each over just a few years as Bob Wachter points our here - one hundred million dollars for UCSF):

... The sample: 959,030 patients with medical records in the Explorys platform. The method: using software to search for blood clots in the health and claims records contained in the database, and then looking for patterns in those patients' height and weight. The result: Exactly the same as the Tromso study.

"And actually the statistical significance of our study was much, much higher because our sample size was 40 times greater," Kaelber said. Kaelber and his team published their results online in July in the Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association.

The conclusion to the article here (subscription required) was:

With the right clinical research informatics tools and EHR data, some types of very large cohort studies can be completed [and, by implication, trusted and acted upon at local, regional or societal levels - ed.] with minimal resources.

This data was, and I don't think this can be refuted, poorly controlled.  There are limits to what "data cleansing" and standardization can accomplish with such data. In methodologies like this, confounders are too numerous to list comprehensively, but just a few - missing data; variability in observations (inter- and intra-observer variability); data originating from different vendor systems with different terminology and definitions, input by myriad people of different backgrounds with differing interpretations of terminologies (students/MD's/RN's etc); different pressures creating bias (time, reimbursement maximization, litigation avoidance); to name just a few.

Several questions: 

  • What is the likelihood these results were themselves a chance outcome? Correlation is not proof, especially where n=1. 
  • How do we reliably identify ante hoc the "types of very large cohort studies" that we can complete?
  • What is the likelihood that such techniques are generalizable to all studies (such as comparative effectiveness research, currently a governmental initiative), especially where issues and confounders might be subtle?
  • Related to generalizability supra, where are the scientific studies that prove methodologies like this are valid and reliable for other than, say, low-granularity epidemiological purposes?  Put more colloquially - how do we know what these efforts attempt to do, in what is almost indisputably a radical deviation from controlled-trial norms, is not "computational alchemy" (i.e., attempting to turn lead into gold)?
  • Is there rigorous data on attempted studies like this that failed to correlate with more traditional research?  Unless the latter is studied and/or attempted and some sense gained of whether a radical approach using uncontrolled data such as this does not fail to a concerning extent, then claims of "revolutions" need to be postponed.

Worst case scenario: large dataset, radical analytics and a political agenda can lead to undesired outcomes.  We need to know what we are doing.


More on these issues in a 2009 article I authored here

I have invited Dr. Kaelber to comment on the questions I raise. 

Note:  I am not challenging this specific study per se, which is an experiment, but am challenging the generalizability of this type of "from data rags to information riches" methodology, as I've done in other posts on similar topics. Not to mention, the overconfidence as expressed in the press, which is what the public including our lawmakers and people responsible for resource allocation read.  I think it's highly premature to write of "revolutionizing medical research."

Sep. 4, 2012

Here is the reply from Dr. Kaelber -

We actually cover many of the points you raise in the discussion of the article.

I think it is important if we are focusing on a scientific discussion of a scientific article to focus on the primary source - the scientific article itself, and not a secondary source - the reporting of the scientific article.

One of the major points in the discussion (quoted from the published manuscript) is that we feel that there are three keys to using pooled, standardized, normalized, and de-identified EHR data, including:

1. Understanding data sources - understanding of the characteristics of the underlying EHR data sources, including a data dictionary and ontologies used.

2. Corroborating data findings - internal and/or external methods to corroborate retrospective EHR cohort study data and/or findings. For example, manual chart review of a sample of the EHR data (internal validation), or other studies demonstrating similar results (external validation), ideally coupled with a biologically plausible hypothesis.

3. Clinical data versus research data - recognizing that retrospective EHR data were typically collected for clinical and not research purposes. Therefore, depending on the type of data, the quality may not meet typical research standards. In some cases, the large quantity of clinical data may help mitigate the fact that it was not collected with the higher precision and accuracy that can occur as part of a prospective research study.

As I was also quoted in the Plain Dealer article as saying this is like a new type of power drill for those who have been used to using hand drills for retrospective (electronic or paper) chart reviews. To be used appropriately, researchers need to understand the opportunities and disadvantages of using of the new tool and be trained on how to use it.

I would also add that, again, as was stated in the introduction for the published paper that clinical research informatics as a field is in its infancy and we need more people involved in the field, more tools for people in the field, and more experience of people using tools in the field to really understand both the contributions and limitations for electronic health record data to advance clinical research.

I hope these comments are of some interest/use.

-David

My thoughts are that use of of experimental EHR-based methodologies like this, that could have significant social implications, requires significant caution and validation.  I think we are in agreement on that point.  The methodology of use of EHR data from myriad sources needs to be shown valid, as well as proven not to be invalid, before the findings of "new" studies that are not attempting to duplicate prior ones are translated to the bedside or beyond.

The disadvantages include, among other issues (and perhaps most important) the spread of premature over-optimism about health IT such as in newspapers.  That problem has, I believe, contributed greatly to the prevalent hyper-enthusiasm and "there's little supportive data - nevertheless, we believe - so let's spend $15+ billion dollars" attitudes about current health IT as I wrote about, for instance, here (ONC's 'Data Palooza') and here (on MU Stage 2 justifications).

Finally, I would question whether increasing the quantity of data could ever reliably compensate for lack of quality (unless, perhaps  the additions were themselves of high quality).  Adding low quality data to already low quality data should not produce better results, it seems to me.

-- SS

Two recent interesting settlements at Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH), both involving technology

Two recent interesting settlements at Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH), both involving technology.

The first case involved a medication error (from a 'miscommunication between doctors and nurses', an infusion pump snafu, and failure to perform obvious follow up labs;  if health IT was involved it would not surprise me).  The second case involved alarm fatigue.

These amounts are interesting considering the age and condition of the patients.


1.  http://www.lubinandmeyer.com/cases/medication-error.html


Medication Error Lawsuit against MGH Settles for $1.25 Million

The plaintiff’s decedent was a 76-year-old woman who died on 11/24/10 from a hemorrhage. Her death occurred following a preventable medication error involving the drug Lepirudin. The patient was given over 30 times too much medication which resulted in uncontrollable internal bleeding and her subsequent death.

Her past medical history included cirrhosis with well preserved hepatocellular synthetic function. She also had Type 2 diabetes, hypertension and hypercholesterolemia, and a history of splenectomy for treatment of severe thrombocytopenia.


and


2.  http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2011/11/mass_general_hospital_alarm_fa.html


Mass. General Hospital 'alarm fatigue' lawsuit settled for $850,000

BOSTON (AP) — The family of an 89-year-old man who died at Massachusetts General Hospital when nurses did not respond to alarms on his cardiac monitor has settled its case against the hospital for $850,000.

I see potential lessons for at least two healthcare stakeholders in these cases:

Hospital executives:  bad technology is not your friend.  get it right before rolling it out, with robust, validated safeguards, to save lives - and to save your organizations from costly litigation and reputational damage.

Clinicians:  bad technology is your enemy.  While hyper-vigilance is mentally exhausting, that's what's required to avoid the fate of the patients - and the clinicians - in the above cases.

Reporting bad technology and making sure the problems are remediated promptly, not glossed over, is equally essential.

Note: my interpretation is that both technology and people issues probably played a role in both these accidents, based on my own knowledge and experience, but that is of course a personal opinion. 

-- SS